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Abstract
A mutual anonymity system enables communication between a client and a service provider without revealing their
identities. In general, the anonymity guarantees made by the protocol are enhanced when a large number of participants
are recruited into the anonymity system. Peer-to-peer (P2P) systems are able to attract a large number of nodes and hence
are highly suitable for anonymity systems. However, the churn (changes in system membership) within P2P networks,
poses a signiﬁcant challenge for low-bandwidth reliable anonymous communication in these networks.
This paper presents MuON, a protocol to achieve mutual anonymity in unstructured P2P networks. MuON leverages
epidemic-style data dissemination to deal with churn. Simulation results and security analysis indicate that MuON pro-
vides mutual anonymity in networks with high churn, while maintaining predictable latencies, high reliability, and low
communication overhead.
 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Reliable anonymous communication is required
by certain online services operating over untrusted
networks. Anonymity is needed to prevent third par-
ties (or adversaries) from gathering information
related to services and their clients. Examples of such
applications include banking, e-voting, ﬁle sharing
and searching, etc. Most online services have a com-
mon model of interactions. A client (the initiator)
sends a request to a node (the responder) that
provides the service; the responder processes the
request, and sends the corresponding response to
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the initiator. Based on this model of interactions, dif-
ferent types of anonymity [1–3] can be provided to
applications: initiator anonymity, responder ano-
nymity, mutual anonymity and unlinkability. Initia-
tor anonymity hides the identity of the initiator from
the responder and adversary. Responder anonymity
hides the identity of the responder from the initiator
and adversary. Mutual anonymity provides both ini-
tiator anonymity and responder anonymity. Unlink-
ability means that the initiator and responder cannot
be identiﬁed as communicating with each other, even
thoughtheycanbeidentiﬁedasparticipatinginsome
communication. All the terms related to anonymity
research are well deﬁned in [4].
Existing anonymity solutions use one of several
basic approaches to achieve diﬀerent forms of ano-
nymity. In the simplest approach, a single proxy is
used for communication between initiator and
responder [5,6]. However, this approach fails if the
proxy is compromised to reveal the identities of
the communicating parties. Many anonymity proto-
cols [7–10,2,11] overcome this single point of failure
using indirection; messages from the sender (initia-
tor/responder) are routed through intermediate
relay nodes till they reach the ﬁnal destination
(responder/initiator). Finally, other protocols [12–
14] provide anonymous communication by multi-
casting messages to a group of nodes. It is impor-
tant to note that in these last two approaches, the
anonymity in the system improves as the number
of participant nodes increases.
This paper presents MuON, a protocol that
shows a good potential to provide reliable, mutually
anonymous communication with unlinkability.
Inspired by the idea of multicasting, MuON uses
epidemic-style data dissemination [15–17] to achieve
reliable communication with the desired anonymity
properties. As seen in prior work [15,17], epidemic
protocols are much more eﬃcient than reliable mul-
ticasting protocols. Intuitively, by broadcasting
every communication message to all members reli-
ably, this type of protocol should provide a very
high potential to achieve anonymity. At the same
time, however, broadcasting every message creates
a concern on the ineﬃcient use of limited network
bandwidth. Thus, in general, limiting the scope of
broadcast without (much) sacriﬁcing the reliability
will be an issue in this line of approach. This paper
aims at extensively investigating a single scope of
broadcasting using an epidemic protocol. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study to use
an epidemic protocol to provide anonymity. Multi-
ple broadcast groups-based approaches will be the
important future work.
MuON operates over unstructured P2P networks
(such as the Gnutella ﬁle sharing system), which are
known to be able to attract a large number of partic-
ipants. Other anonymity protocols have been
designed to operate over P2P networks. These proto-
cols have used diﬀerent kinds of P2P networks such
as structured P2P systems [11], IP layer P2P systems
[9] and hybrid P2P systems [3]. An unstructured P2P
network does not impose a structure on its partici-
pant nodes and thus has several desirable character-
istics such as administrative ease, ease of deployment
and self-organization. However, unstructured P2P
networks pose signiﬁcant challenges. For example
Gnutella is known to consume high bandwidth
[18]. Other studies [19] have shown that P2P systems
exhibit high churn (changes in system membership);
peers frequently leave/join the network and most
peers are connected to the overlay for a short period
of time. Further, the nodes within the P2P network
cannot be trusted. Peers may attempt to tamper with
messages, masquerade as the responder, drop mes-
sages that they are supposed to forward, collude to
violate the anonymity guarantees, or subvert the
protocol by any other means.
Earlier work of MuON was presented previously
in [20] and was shown to provide high reliability
while maintaining low latencies and low overhead.
Here we present an extended version of MuON with
enhanced anonymity guarantees and additional per-
formance metrics. The modiﬁcations ensure that the
protocol terminates in dynamic networks without
losing anonymity or reliability, thus bounding the
consumed network resources. MuON has also been
extended to operate without a trusted PKI (public
key infrastructure). The extended version also
includes modiﬁcations that enable MuON to with-
stand intersection attacks.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sum-
marizes the prior approaches for anonymity and
introduces epidemic protocols. Section 3.1 discusses
the goals of MuON. Section 3 describes MuON in
detail, followed by the anonymity and performance
evaluations in Section 4. The contributions and
future work are summarized in Section 5.
2. Related work and motivation
This section reviews epidemic protocols and prior
systems providing diﬀerent kinds of anonymity over
various network architectures.
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2.1. Anonymity by mixes
Systems like Mix-Net [21], Babel [22], MorphMix
[23] and Mixminion [24] are based on mix-networks.
These systems hide communication by encrypting
messages in layers of public key cryptography, and
relaying messages through a group of dedicated
message relays called ‘mixes’. Each mix decrypts,
delays and reorders messages before relaying them
to another mix. While these systems achieve strong
anonymity guarantees, the randomly introduced
delays can result in high latencies unsuitable for
interactive applications.
2.2. Anonymity by proxy
Systems like Anonymizer [5], Lucent Personalized
Web Assistant [6], PRA:Proxy for Responder Ano-
nymity [12] and APFS Unicast [12] use an intermedi-
ate proxy to provide anonymity. As these systems
trust the proxy for performance and anonymity
guarantees, they are vulnerable to failure if the
proxy is compromised or if the proxy fails.
2.3. Anonymity by single-path forwarding
Many anonymity protocols forward messages
along a single anonymous path, formed through
the group of nodes within the infrastructure. This
anonymous path can be speciﬁcally created, or is
formed by random forwarding.
Onion Routing [10] provides anonymous com-
munication using a dedicated set of message relays
called ‘onion routers’. The sender selects a path
from the set of onion routers. It then wraps the
data within encrypted layers to form an onion.
The innermost layer of encryption in the onion
uses the encryption key of the path’s last hop,
while the outermost layer uses the encryption key
of the path’s ﬁrst hop. Onion routers co-operate
and forward the onion from the sender to the
destination.
Several systems use onion routing to create tun-
nels for anonymous communication. Tor [8] pro-
vides mutual anonymity by creating tunnels to
rendezvous points, while Tarzan [9] provides initia-
tor anonymity by building tunnels through an IP
layer P2P system. Similarly, MorphMix [23] creates
anonymous tunnels through P2P networks using
nested encryption. TAP [11] uses replicated tunnels
to provide reliable anonymous communication only
within structured P2P networks.
Xiao et al. [3] propose protocols that use hybrid
P2P networks to provide mutual anonymity. Trusted
third parties coordinate anonymous message trans-
fers between communicating entities. Crowds [2] pro-
vides initiator anonymity using random forwarding.
Messages are sent to a randomly chosen peer called a
jondo. Each jondo then randomly decides to either
send the message to the responder or to another
jondo.
In networks with high churn (nodes frequently
join and leave the P2P network), approaches using
single anonymous paths are likely to suﬀer from path
losses. Consider an anonymous path through n
nodes. If p is the probability of a node leaving the
overlay, then a given path is valid with a probability
of ð1   pÞ
n. With increasing path lengths (increasing
n) and increasing network churn (increasing p), the
probability that a given path remains valid dimin-
ishes. Hence approaches using a single-path will
incur with greater probability, the additional over-
headofdetectingandrebuildingfailedpaths.Provid-
ingthiskindoffaulttolerancecanbeahighoverhead
operation and has not been extensively explored in
the context of maintaining anonymity guarantees.
2.4. Anonymity by group communication
Many systems like APFS Multicast [12] and
Hordes [14] multicast messages within a large group
to achieve anonymous communication. Likewise
GAP [7] uses controlled ﬂooding to send a message
throughout the network, while P
5 [13] deﬁnes a log-
ical hierarchy of broadcast groups, sending mes-
sages to groups of diﬀerent sizes.
Protocols that depend on group communication
primitives are ideally suited for networks with high
churn, because the departure of a few nodes does
not substantially impact the communication between
the sender and receiver. Previous work [14] also indi-
cates that the use of multicasting helps reduce
communication latencies. However, the lack of
widespreaddeploymentofIPmulticastinfrastructure
inhibitsdeploymentofprotocolsbasedonthistypeof
multicast [12,13]. GAP [7] takes a diﬀerent approach,
but achieves reliability by ﬂooding, which may not
scale well in large unstructured P2P networks.
2.5. Epidemic protocols
Epidemic (or gossip) protocols [25] are a well-
studied class of protocols for low-cost reliable data
dissemination within groups. They have been shown
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to be much more eﬃcient than ﬂooding based
approaches [26,27]. Epidemic protocols provide
higher reliability and scalability while using lower
bandwidth [16], when compared to other reliable
multicast protocols. They provide abimodal guaran-
tee of reliability [15]; a message reaches all members
of the group with a high probability, and the proba-
bility that it will reach to just a few members of the
group is very low. Studies have shown that the time
required to disseminate data to the entire group is
logðNÞ, where N is the number of nodes in the group.
Due to these desirable characteristics, MuON uses
an epidemic-style protocol for data dissemination.
A simpliﬁed gossip protocol is depicted in Fig. 1.
Each node runs several rounds of the gossip proto-
col. In each round, a node selects a random node as
its gossip target. The node sends the gossip target(s)
a gossip message containing a list of message identi-
ﬁers that it has heard (indicated by dotted lines
between nodes). If the list contains a message iden-
tiﬁer which the gossip target has not received, the
gossip target will request the node to send it (indi-
cated by solid lines between nodes).
Three important parameters impact gossip proto-
col performance. First is the number of gossip tar-
gets FanOut used in each round. (FanOut is two in
the ﬁgure.) The second parameter is the time
Dinterval between successive protocol rounds. (In the
ﬁgure, as node p starts gossip rounds at time t1
and t6, the Dinterval is t6   t1.) The ﬁnal parameter
is the number of rounds GC that a message is gos-
siped. These parameters determine the speed and
eﬃciency of the protocol and have been rigorously
studied by Birman et al. [15].
3. MuON
This section describes the details of MuON. We
ﬁrst give the goals, notation, system model and
assumptions for deploying MuON, followed by a
description of the basic data dissemination proto-
col. Finally, we describe the use of this data dissem-
ination protocol to eﬀect communication, between
initiator and responder, with the desired properties.
3.1. Goals of MuON
MuON aims to balance between performance
and anonymity in dynamic P2P networks. The main
goals are described below:
1. Mutual Anonymity: Initiators and responders can
communicate without knowing the actual iden-
tity of the other communicating party.
2. Unlinkability: Communication between initiators
and responders cannot be correlated.
3. Bounded Latency: Latency is bounded.
4. Reliability: Reliable communication between ini-
tiator and responder(s).
5. Communication Overhead: Overhead incurred by
a peer should be low.
6. Scalability: Metrics like reliability, anonymity,
latency and overhead should scale well with the
P2P network size and churn.
7. Integrity and Conﬁdentiality: Peers cannot mod-
ify messages in-transit and cannot masquerade
as responders; requests can be read only by the
intended responder; responses can be read only
by the appropriate initiator.
3.2. System model
MuON operates over an unstructured P2P net-
work. Let N be the number of nodes within the over-
lay. We assume that nodes within the overlay know
at least logðNÞ other peers in the overlay. This mem-
bership list for epidemic protocols can be maintained
using services such as SCAMP [28], ‘‘Peer Sampling
Service” [29], and DIMPLE [30]. MuON assumes
that all initiators and responders are members of
the P2P network. All protocol messages use low-cost
unreliable transport (UDP) for communication.
3
Each peer is associated with a unique public key,
which is used in lieu of actual node identities. The
message sending protocol of MuON ensures that
mutual anonymity and unlinkability are maintained,
while the use of public and session keys maintains
data integrity and conﬁdentiality. The public keys
p
q
r
s
M0
Gossip message
Message ‘pull’
t2 t0 t1 t3 t4 t5 t6
Fig. 1. Epidemic protocols.
3 Though messages between peers are sent unreliably, MuON
reliably transfers messages between communicating entities.
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are not tied to any speciﬁc algorithm; for example
incomparable public keys [31] could be used.
To access a service in MuON, initiators require
the public keys of peers that provide the corre-
sponding service. MuON provides the ability to per-
form an anonymous network-wide search to map a
search query (i.e. a desired service) to a set of public
keys. Alternately a trusted PKI may be used to pro-
vide correct public keys corresponding to a search
query. It is interesting to note that the communica-
tion between the PKI and the initiator must be
anonymous. However, it is easy to conceive the
PKI as a service within MuON, whose public key
is well known and distributed out-of-band.
Peers are assumed to have approximately syn-
chronized clocks; the diﬀerence between clock read-
ings of any two peers at a single instant of time
(called the clock skew) is within a known bound.
Clocks may be synchronized in hardware, software,
or some hybrid combination [32–34]. The increasing
availability of global positioning system (GPS)
based hardware allows physically dispersed systems
to be synchronized [35] with a clock skew of a few
microseconds
4 via their mutual synchronization to
Coordinated Universal Time (UTC).
5
Throughout this paper, the adversary is assumed
to be passive and external. Depending on attacks,
the adversary may be either local or global.
This paper considers logical network topologies
induced by membership services, such as SCAMP
[28] and DIMPLE [30], which are used for epidemic
protocols. One common assumption in epidemic
protocols is that each node can randomly select
logðNÞ diﬀerent nodes (fanout) in each cycle. As
the network size grows, providing such information
for each node is diﬃcult for centralized service.
Hence distributed algorithms and protocols have
been sought in an eﬀort to provide such membership
information in a scalable manner. One common
approach in that line of work is to locate a tiny sub-
set (local view) of the entire membership at each
node, and have the nodes exchange part of the local
view with that of another randomly chosen node;
this is known as shuﬄing. This seemingly simple
operation in fact produces local views populated
from the entire membership randomly and uni-
formly [36,37]. Thus a node knows at least as many
nodes as the size of the local view. At any given
instance, we can create a graph (called knowledge
graph) reﬂecting the induced logical topology by
adding an edge from P to Q if P knows Q.A s
reported in [37,30], such a knowledge graph is a ran-
dom graph with the same number of nodes and
edges. Assuming that MuON uses such a member-
ship service, the network topology remains random
independently of the physical networking.
Obviously, this claim does not directly involve
shuﬄe message loss due to possible network conges-
tion patterns. While congestion-embedded simula-
tion would produce more realistic outcomes,
applying ﬂat message loss rates seems to be an alter-
native to focus on the eﬀectiveness of the reliable
broadcasting of MuON. Adopting this argument,
this paper uses the simpliﬁed approach of using
10% packet loss rate throughout the simulation.
Using network congestion patterns in simulation
remains as future work.
An interesting question is whether this idea is
directly applicable to wireless ad hoc mobile net-
works (MANET). The fundamental diﬀerence
between MANETs and wired P2P systems is that
while a peer can directly communicate with another
peer using the underlying routing infrastructure, a
mobile node is not able to without having other
intermediate nodes forward a packet toward a des-
tination in MANET. As a result, gossiping to fan-
out nodes would involve many other intermediate
nodes in MANET. This, in turn, would make
MuON-like gossiping impractical. Fundamental
research needs to be done to support eﬀective gos-
siping for MANET. The original question of
whether MuON-like anonymous communication
protocols can exist for MANET then could be
answered after such fundamental work. This paper
leaves this question open for future work.
3.3. Notation
The protocol uses the following notation.
Notation Description
ksession Symmetric session key
kþ
A, k 
A Public and private key of node A
r1 Nonce
fdatagks data encrypted/signed using key ks (ks is
public, private or session key)
HðdataÞ Cryptographic hash (e.g. SHA-1)
computed over data
(continued on next page)
4 Evaluation (Section 4) shows that MuON tolerates clock
skews up to 18   RTT (RTT = round trip time of UDP).
5 UTC is independent of local timezone and daylight savings.
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Notation Description
self IP-address of node
pinter Intermediate probability
a, b Bounds on epidemic lifetimes
QUERY_HDR Search query initiated by I. Format is
{T deadline, k
þ
I , query}
MSG_HDR Header associated with MSG. Format
is {T deadline, currOwner, hdr,H ( hdr)}
Contents of hdr are deﬁned in Section
3.5.I fMSG_HDR is associated with a
MSG,MSG_HDR.currOwner isnon-null
and indicates the node owning MSG
T current Current time on synchronized clock
T join T current recorded at start of session
T deadline Time at which message is invalidated
skewmax Bounds on the clock skew within the
system (accuracy is  skewmax)
Dinterval Interval between successive rounds
Davg Average life of peers in the system
FanOut Number of gossip targets per round
GC Number of rounds message is
gossiped
MSG Data (request/response) message
3.4. Data dissemination in MuON
MuON’s data dissemination protocol is unidirec-
tional; it is used to send requests from an initiator to
a responder and then again to send a response from
the responder to the initiator. This protocol is then
used for sending messages between initiators and
responders and also for mapping services to the cor-
responding public keys (discussed in Section 3.5).
The data dissemination protocol operates via the
messages MSG_HDR and MSG. MSG_HDR contains
information such as identiﬁers and cryptographic
keys, while MSG encapsulates the associated data.
As MSG_HDR contains only protocol data, we
assume
6 that the size of MSG_HDR is much less than
MSG. The data dissemination protocol is depicted in
Fig. 2, which shows node X sending MSG to node Y.
MuON uses an epidemic protocol to disseminate
MSG_HDR to all nodes within the P2P network,
while the larger MSG is disseminated to only a few
nodes within the network (shaded within Fig. 2).
As explained in detail later, the number of nodes
which receive MSG depends on the value of pinter.
The protocol ensures that the responder always gets
MSG. As the larger MSG is not sent to the entire net-
work, MuON substantially reduces the bandwidth
usage. Also, since multiple nodes within the network
receive MSG (all the shaded nodes), multiple nodes
are potential receivers and senders of MSG, giving
MuON its anonymity guarantees. MuON derives
its properties of reliability and bounded latencies
from its epidemic nature.
Every node running MuON maintains two buf-
fers; one headerBuﬀer to store the message headers
and the other messageBuﬀer to store the corre-
sponding messages. Every node tracks the number
of protocol rounds gossipCount each header has
been gossiped. Algorithm 1 describes the details
for handling these buﬀers. Algorithm 2 explains
the protocol executed by each node after every
Dinterval units of time. This algorithm describes an
epidemic protocol for disseminating the headers.
Each node selects FanOut random nodes from the
group as gossip targets and sends them a list with
each message header MSG_HDR currently within
headerBuﬀer. As given in Algorithm 3, whenever A
gets the message, A tries to decrypt
7 the message.
If A cannot decrypt the message then A performs
one of two actions: it may just add the header to
its header buﬀer or with some probability pinter it
may go back and get the corresponding MSG from
B. In the ﬁrst case, A gossips with its neighbors that
6 This assumption holds true in applications with large
responses (e.g. ﬁle-transfer and web-browsing). In these applica-
tions, MuON achieves substantial bandwidth savings compared
to other group communication based anonymity protocols. We
anticipate that MuON will also provide a bandwidth reduction
for applications with small data messages (e.g. e-voting) that
require reliable delivery, though these applications are not
evaluated in this paper.
A
B
MESSAGE TRANSFER
MESSAGE HEADERS
P
A,MSG
A,MSG
X
Y
Node X communicating to Y.
X,MSG
X, MSG
B,MSG
Fig. 2. Message sent from node X to Y.
7 If the decrypted message contains an expected value like a
known identiﬁer or public key, the node can conclude ‘‘success-
ful” decryption.
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B currently has the message. In the second case,
when A gets the MSG from B, it changes the
currOwner ﬁeld of MSG_HDR to A. Thus when A gos-
sips the header, it indicates itself as the message
owner. With this property, MuON achieves its ano-
nymity guarantees as there are many equiprobable
owners of the same message. If A can decrypt the
message, it indicates that the message was intended
for A and thus A contacts currOwner and pulls the
message. In this case A also gossips with its neigh-
bors that it has the message to send. Thus the
responder in MuON behaves exactly the same as
any other node in the network (with the exception
that it always pulls the message).
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3.5. Communication in MuON
This subsection ﬁrst describes how a node within
MuON can anonymously obtain the public key of a
responder. We then describe how the data dissemi-
nation protocol is used for anonymous communica-
tion between initiator and responder.
Obtaining public keys of responders: To obtain
public keys of responders providing a service, an ini-
tiator I multicasts a search-query describing the
service by invoking sendQuery(search-query). send-
Query encapsulates the search-query and key k
þ
I into
a QUERY_HDR and disseminates it throughout the
network using a push-epidemic protocol (The rele-
vant portions of Algorithms 2 and 3.). Thus the
query is delivered to each peer within the network.
On receiving a search-query, a peer R that provides
a matching service anonymously sends its public
key k
þ
R to node I (This is equivalent to invoking send-
Message(fk
þ
Rgk
þ
I , NULL)). On receiving k
þ
R, node I
can now anonymously access the service.
8
Initiator and responder communication: While the
data dissemination protocol achieves anonymity,
cryptographic measures are needed to ensure mes-
sage integrity and conﬁdentiality. The following
describes how the data dissemination protocol is
used by initiators and responders for secure anony-
mous communication.
Sending a request: An initiator I uses the follow-
ing steps to initiate communication with node R by
sending the request data.
1. I generates a symmetric session key ksession, which
is used to encrypt all data messages.
2. I generates a nonce r1, which is used to correlate
responses with this request.
3. The MSG is generated as fr1;datagksession.
4. I creates a header hdr, corresponding to MSG as
hdr ¼f r1;ksession;k
þ
I ;fHðDÞgk
 
I gk
þ
R where D ¼
fr1;ksession;k
þ
I ;MSGg and HðÞ is a cryptographic
hash function.
5. I invokes sendMessage(hdr, MSG).
Responding to a request: Algorithm 3 eventually
delivers MSG_HDR and MSG to the responder R,
which proceeds with the following steps.
1. R decrypts hdr using k
 
R, to obtain ksession, r1 and
the initiator’s public key k
þ
I . R now runs integrity
checks with the cryptographic hash.
2. Using ksession, R decrypts MSG to obtain data.
3. Let response be the corresponding reply, which R
needs to send to I. R creates MSG ¼f r1;reponseg
ksession using ksession and r1 as recovered in step 1.
4. R creates a header hdr corresponding to the
response as hdr ¼f r1;fHðDÞgk
 
Rgk
þ
I , where D ¼
fr1;MSGg and HðÞ is a cryptographic hash
function.
5. R invokes sendMessage(hdr,MSG).
3.6. Miscellaneous protocol properties
Epidemic Termination: Epidemic protocols
achieve reliability by gossiping messages until all
protocol participants receive (with very high proba-
bility) the message. However, in dynamic P2P net-
works, the set of protocol participants changes
unpredictably over time. Reaching all protocol par-
ticipants would then result in a perpetually surviv-
ing epidemic. Hence, MuON requires some other
mechanism for termination of the epidemic without
compromising its anonymity properties.
A ﬁxed value of GC is not adequate to terminate
the epidemic. Each time a node joins the network
and receives a given header for the ﬁrst time, it will
disseminate the header GC additional times. Since
the network membership changes continually, epi-
demics may survive perpetually. Another simple
approach is to choose some maximum integer count
of rounds for which a message is propagated. The
initiator chooses this count value and appends it
to the message; each subsequent propagation of
the message by any node decrements the count by
one. When the count reaches zero, the message is
no longer propagated. However, implementing this
approach without sacriﬁcing anonymity is diﬃcult.
Suppose each initiator randomly selects the round
count from within some range of values. Then any
node that chooses the maximum value of the range
can be identiﬁed as initiator.
MuON applies approximately synchronized
clocks toward epidemic termination. A MuON
header originating at time T is associated with a
deadline T deadline that speciﬁes the wall-clock time
at which the header is to be invalidated. This
ensures that even in dynamic networks, the associ-
ated epidemic terminates at approximately T deadline
and the epidemic has a lifetime of approximately
T deadline   T.
8 A query may result in multiple responses. A reputation
scheme [38,39] may be used to select one trusted response.
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If all messages have the same lifetime, a peer
directly receiving a header from the initiator can
guess the identity of the initiator. Hence the message
lifetime is chosen between a and b, where b > a.
MuON uses a value of a equal to the maximum
communication latency for epidemic protocols in
static networks (  log2ðoverlay sizeÞ [15]). This
ensures that with high probability all nodes that
are in the network when the dissemination begins,
that remain in the network over the lifetime interval,
and that remain reachable, will receive the message.
Though all nodes choose a lifetime value between a
and b, T deadline is computed by adding the selected
lifetime value to the local synchronized clock value.
Since local clocks are only approximately synchro-
nized, the identity of the initiator is obscured. Using
T deadline an adversary receiving a header directly
from the initiator can guess the message’s time of
origin (and detect the initiator) with a probability
1
ðb aÞ ð1þ2 skewmaxÞ.
9 Thus clock skew (and clock syn-
chronization) is essential for terminating MuON
epidemics anonymously in this way.
Aligning with long-lived nodes: In dynamic P2P
networks, peers alternately join and leave the net-
work. As discussed in section 15, this continual
change in system membership aids an adversarial
attack called an intersection attack. To enhance ano-
nymity, peers in MuON pull data messages with a
probability p proportional to the time that has
elapsed since joining the system (termed age). Thus
in MuON long-lived nodes pull data messages with
a higher probability.
10 For simplicity, we consider p
increasing linearly with the peer’s age (as computed
by method currentProbability in Algorithm 1),
though other relations may be suitable depending
on the network model.
4. Evaluation
In this section, we describe MuON’s simulation
model and evaluate the performance, anonymity
and other security guarantees.
4.1. Simulation model
Measurement studies of unstructured P2P net-
works [40,19,41] indicate that these systems exhibit
dynamic membership, because peers alternately join
and leave the network. Peers participate in the pro-
tocol only during the time between joining and leav-
ing the network. This time is called the session time
(or age) and the resultant dynamism is called the
network churn. The network churn is related to the
average session time of the peers within the net-
work. As the average session time decreases, the
membership of the P2P network changes at a faster
rate and is said to exhibit a higher churn [42,43].
Prior experiences [44,42,43] indicate that network
churn impacts the performance of protocols over
P2P networks. Hence we evaluate MuON over
P2P networks of varying sizes and varying churn.
We model network churn using an approach sim-
ilar to that described by Liben-Nowell et al. [45].
This model has also been used for evaluating distrib-
uted hash tables over P2P networks [42,43]. Peers
within the network are assigned exponentially dis-
tributed session times. When a peer reaches the end
of its session time, it leaves the network. Prior work
[46] has shown that the average session time (amount
of churn) within a network depends on the applica-
tion. Since MuON is not speciﬁc to any application,
we simulate networks with varying churn.
Simulating network churn has been relatively well
addressed in the literature. One issue is whether a
good mathematical distribution exists to model net-
work churn. Some work [47] suggest the use of a dis-
tribution function backed up by real measurements,
while some others [45] advocate the same method
adopted in this paper. A second issue in simulating
network churn is whether the network size should
remain constant. A common approach used in the
literature is to maintain a ﬁxed network size in indi-
vidual simulation runs. This helps in decoupling the
impact of network size from that of network churn.
Furthermore, to simulate networks with varying
sizes, one requires an underlying management ser-
vice which can provide the network size dynamically,
since epidemic protocol parameters depend on the
network size. Estimating network size can be found
in separate work such as [48]. Including dynamically
changing network sizes and diﬀerent distribution
models for network size, would produce more realis-
tic outcomes. However, since this paper focuses on
anonymity these improvements are left for future
work.
9 If initiator with clock skew skew sends a message at wall-clock
time T, then T deadline ¼ T þ lifetime þ skew. For a given T deadline,
an adversary can guess lifetime with a probability 1
b a and skew
with a probability 1
1þ2 skewmax.
10 P2P applications using MuON for communication, may use
this property to align with the network topology, though details
are not discussed within this paper.
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MuON is simulated using PeerSim [49], a P2P
simulator designed speciﬁcally for epidemic proto-
cols. The simulator executes the protocol in a series
of cycles, where the time interval between each cycle
is assumed to be suﬃcient for unidirectional unreli-
able (UDP) message transmission with a loss rate of
10%.
11 This UDP loss rate of 10% is a rough model
of congestion. All time in the simulations is mea-
sured in terms of cycles, which is the smallest unit
of time within the simulator. In the simulation
model, a network with churn 0 is a static network,
which does not change during the simulation. At
churn 0, the average session time was chosen as
100 cycles (a factor of 10 over the maximum time
for one run of the protocol in a system of 1000
nodes), to enable simulation of several rounds of
MuON simultaneously. An increase of 0.1 in net-
work churn decreases the average session time of
the nodes by a factor of 1
10. When a node leaves
the network, another immediately joins, thus keep-
ing the overlay size constant. This helps us to under-
stand the impact of overlay size and churn
independently. We also model networks with vary-
ing clock skew. If the clock skew in a simulated net-
work is skew, then the clock skew of each node is
selected uniformly between  skew and þskew. The
node’s clock skew remains constant throughout its
lifetime.
In the simulations, FanOut and GC are main-
tained at log2ðoverlay sizeÞ and Dinterval is maintained
at one cycle. These parameters are common to all
epidemic protocols and their impact on performance
is similar to that determined by previous studies [15].
We maintain a ¼ log2ðoverlay sizeÞ and b ¼ 2   a to
bound epidemic lifetimes such that message delivery
may be attempted but the epidemic is terminated
eventually. The parameter Davg controls the rate
of increase of pcurrent. We simulate two diﬀerent
approaches for determining the value of Davg.I n
the ﬁrst approach (denoted by c ¼ 0), each node
computes Davg using the session-time of its previous
sessions.
12 In the second approach, the membership
service
13 is used to provide Davg. We use the follow-
ing values for Davg;0 :5   Dlife;Dlife and 2   Dlife
(denoted by c ¼ 1;2 and 3, respectively) where Dlife
is the average session time within the network. Thus
c ¼ 1;2 and 3 represents increasing Davg.
4.2. Performance evaluation
This section discusses MuON’s performance in
networks with varying sizes and churn. Since
MuON cannot provide reliable communication at
churn 1, we measure performance metrics (other
than reliability) in networks with churn between 0
and 0.8. Performance metrics are averages over mul-
tiple messages exchanged between initiator and
responder for a given set of parameters such as
skew, c and pinter.
Reliability: The reliability of MuON is measured
by the delivery ratio achieved in networks of varying
sizes and churn. The delivery ratio is the fraction of
the sent requests that were ultimately delivered at
the ﬁnal destination. When delivery ratio is one, it
indicates that all requests that were sent were even-
tually delivered at their destination, thus indicating
reliable communication. Fig. 3 shows the delivery
ratio for networks with varying sizes and churn. It
can be seen that MuON maintains a high delivery
ratio of almost one, independent of the overlay size
and churn. This high reliability indicates its suitabil-
ity for highly dynamic P2P networks.
Bounded Communication Latency: One of
MuON’s goal is to achieve communication within
a predictably bounded time interval. This character-
istic is important from the application’s point of
view; shorter latencies are important for application
interactivity while bounded latencies are needed by
applications to set timeouts and detect message
losses. Since MuON operates over an overlay net-
work, we measure the latency in terms of number
of protocol cycles required for the message to be
11 In general, the time required for unidirectional UDP message
transmission is 0:5   round trip time. Based on reported average
round trip times [50], one cycle is approximately 50–100 ms.
12 Davg ¼1during the ﬁrst session.
13 Membership services [28] using unsubscriptions or leases can
estimate the average session-time of participant peers.
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delivered at its destination. (The duration of a pro-
tocol cycle corresponds roughly to the time required
for delivery and processing of a single UDP mes-
sage.). Fig. 4 shows the average number of cycles
required for messages to be delivered; the bars indi-
cate the variation in the delivery latency. It can be
seen that the delivery latency is similar at each net-
work size irrespective of network churn, indicating
that the latencies in MuON are predictable and
bounded. The latency does increase sublinearly with
increasing network size, since the message lifetime is
proportional to logðnetwork sizeÞ. When a peer
pulls a data message, it does not gossip the header
till the data message arrives. Hence as seen in Figs.
5 and 6, when data messages are pulled by a greater
number of peers (caused by increasing pinter and
decreasing Davg), the latency increases marginally.
Epidemic Termination: As discussed in Section
3.6, epidemic protocols tend to survive perpetually
in dynamic networks. MuON terminates message
epidemics by associating a deadline with each header
in a system with approximately synchronized clocks.
We study the eﬀectiveness of this approach by mea-
suring the epidemic lifetime in the networks of vary-
ing sizes and churn. A message’s epidemic lifetime is
measured as the duration of time (measured in
cycles) during which at least one peer actively gossips
the corresponding header. Figs. 7–10 show that the
epidemic lifetime is not aﬀected by overlay size,
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Davg, pinter and skew. Fig. 7 shows that MuON suc-
cessfully terminates epidemics despite of high churn,
though the epidemic lifetime increases gradually.
Node Overhead: When a peer joins MuON, it
contributes its resources to forward messages from
other peers. These resources are needed to send,
encrypt, decrypt and store messages and are propor-
tional to message size. Similar to prior work in epi-
demic protocols [32], we study the node overhead in
MuON by measuring the header and data through-
put. The throughput is measured as the number of
header (or data) messages processed per cycle per
node for each anonymous message sent in the net-
work. Fig. 11 shows that the throughput is essen-
tially independent of the overlay size and increases
with churn. It can be seen that the throughput of
larger data messages is much lower than the header
throughput. Header messages are small in size and
thus the processing overhead for each header, stor-
age and bandwidth is low. MuON uses private/pub-
lic key encryption for small headers and faster
symmetric cryptography for large data messages,
to reduce the encryption overhead. Fig. 12 indicates
that Davg does not signiﬁcantly impact the node
overhead. Fig. 13 shows that the data throughput
increases with pinter, while not impacting the header
throughput.
Network Resources: MuON’s message sending
protocol is designed to use low network resources
as compared to previous multicast-based anonymity
protocols. The network resources can be measured
by the network bandwidth consumed, when one
data message is sent anonymously.
Let HDRsize and DATAsize be the size of header and
data messages, respectively, and N be overlay size.
When a message is sent anonymously, a multicast-
based anonymity protocol multicasts this message
to N nodes. Hence the consumed bandwidth will be
at least N   DATAsize. Note that this is a conservative
estimate,since itignoresthebandwidthconsumed by
control messages and data message re-transmissions
required in the presence of network churn. On the
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other hand, MuON disseminates the data message to
only a subset of nodes within the overlay, ensuring
that the ﬁnal destination is a member of this sub-
set. The bandwidth consumed in MuON is h 
HDRsize þ /   DATAsize, where h and / is the number
of header and data transfers in the network. Consid-
eringthevaluesofhand/fromFig.14,itcanbeseen
that MuON provides reliable anonymous communi-
cation at a cost lower than N   DATAsize.
14 Fig. 17
depicts the bandwidth consumed in MuON as com-
pared to a multicast based approach, while Figs. 15
and 16 show that the bandwidth consumed by data
messages increases with increasing pinter and decreas-
ing Davg, while the resources consumed by header
messages are unaﬀected.
Scalability: Scalability is an important character-
istic in systems designed for P2P networks. It is evi-
dent from the presented results that MuON is
scalable. The protocol exhibits desirable perfor-
mance irrespective of the overlay size and churn.
4.3. Anonymity guarantees
This section describes how MuON achieves
mutual anonymity, followed by an evaluation of
anonymity in overlays of varying sizes and churn.
We then describe the protocol behavior under vari-
ous adversarial attacks. The anonymity metrics are
averages over multiple messages exchanged between
multiple initiator and responder pairs for a given set
of parameters such as skew, c and pinter.
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14 Considering 128 bit cryptographic hash, 128 bit crypto-
graphic keys, 32 bit IP addresses and 32 bit nonce, the maximum
size of hdr is 416 bits and HDRsize ¼ 576 bits (72 bytes). If the
transferred data is a 1 MB media ﬁle then DATAsize ¼ 1;048;576
bytes. From Fig. 14, if the overlay has 10,000 nodes with churn
0.8, then h ¼ 600;000 and / ¼ 4500. Hence the volume of MuON
header messages is 41.2 MB and the volume of MuON data
messages is 4500 MB. In this system with 10,000 nodes,
N   DATAsize ¼ 10;000 MB.
220K
180K
140K
100K
60K
20K
 0  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8
10K
8K
6K
4K
2K
H
e
a
d
e
r
 
t
r
a
n
s
f
e
r
s
D
a
t
a
 
t
r
a
n
s
f
e
r
s
Churn
pinter=0.5, skew=3, overlay size=4000
Header transfers  γ=0
Data transfers γ=0
Header transfers  γ=1
Data transfers γ=1
Header transfers  γ=2
Data transfers γ=2
Header transfers  γ=3
Data transfers γ=3
Fig. 15. Impact of Davg on network overhead.
220K
180K
140K
100K
60K
20K
 0  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8
10K
8K
6K
4K
2K
H
e
a
d
e
r
 
t
r
a
n
s
f
e
r
s
D
a
t
a
 
t
r
a
n
s
f
e
r
s
Churn
skew=3, γ=0, overlay size=4000
Header transfers pinter=0.3
Data transfers pinter=0.3
Header transfers pinter=0.8
Data transfers pinter=0.8
Fig. 16. Impact of pinter on network overhead.
 0
 1
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6
 7
 0  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8
 0
 0.05
 0.1
 0.15
 0.2
 0.25
 0.3
H
e
a
d
e
r
 
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
p
u
t
D
a
t
a
 
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
p
u
t
 
Churn
skew=3, γ=0, overlay size=4000
Header throughput (pinter=0.3)
Data throughput   (pinter=0.3)
Header throughput (pinter=0.8)
Data throughput   (pinter=0.8)
Fig. 13. Impact of pinter on node overhead.
N. Bansod et al./Computer Networks 52 (2008) 915–934 927Author's personal copy
4.3.1. Mutual anonymity in MuON
Since MuON does not make use of cover traﬃc
and padding, and does not hide information such
as message lengths, T deadline and currOwner, epidemic
traﬃc can be observed at each individual node.
Consequently as discussed in Section 4.3, MuON
is vulnerable to a sustained attack by a global adver-
sary. However as discussed in the sections below,
the anonymity guarantees of end-to-end traﬃc
between initiators and responders are maintained
in the presence of adversaries that can observe only
a limited portion of the network for a given period
of time.
Similar to anonymity protocols that use multi-
casting [12] or broadcasting [13], MuON achieves
mutual anonymity on the virtue that several inter-
mediate peers receive a message. When an interme-
diate node receives a MSG, it gossips the
corresponding MSG_HDR with itself as the owner.
From an observer’s perspective, any node claiming
to be the current owner could be the actual sender
of the message. Similarly, when an intermediate
node receives MSG_HDR, it probabilistically pulls
the corresponding MSG. Hence from the local obser-
ver’s perspective, any peer that eventually pulls MSG
could potentially be the receiver. Thus in the proto-
col, an observer (initiator, responder or intermedi-
ate node) cannot diﬀerentiate the initiator and
responder from the other peers. The use of public
keys also enables the initiator and responder to
communicate without the identity of each other.
Thus mutual anonymity and unlinkability is
achieved.
The degree of anonymity provided by an ano-
nymity system depends on the number of nodes that
have an equiprobable chance of playing a certain
role (initiator/responder). Let S (called the anonym-
ity set) denote the set of nodes that have an equi-
probable chance of being the initiator/responder.
Shields et al. [14] show that the degree of anonymity
in the system is 1   1
jSj. In MuON, for a given com-
municating pair of initiator and responder, any
node that receives MSG has some probability of
being the initiator or responder. In this paper, all
such nodes are collectively considered the anonym-
ity set. This is because a local adversary cannot tell
if the probability of being the sender or receiver is
equal for all such nodes without a large scale collu-
sion. Intersection attacks by a global adversary
would make this anonymity set smaller. Formal
analysis of this anonymity set using an information
theoretic technique such as introduced by [51] is left
as an important future work. Therefore, we measure
the anonymity of MuON as the fraction of peers
within the overlay that received a given MSG (called
the normalized anonymity). Fig. 18 shows that the
anonymity is almost constant in networks of vary-
ing sizes and churn. Figs. 19 and 20 indicate that
the anonymity is controlled by pinter and Davg.
Attacks by Adversary: Anonymity systems are
susceptible to several possible attacks. However,
the adversary must utilize varying amounts of
resources to complete these attacks successfully.
To withstand powerful adversaries, several systems
[10,9,3,11,8] use techniques like cover traﬃc genera-
tion, message buﬀering and per-hop message
encryption. This paper evaluates MuON without
using these high-cost
15 approaches, by describing
the protocol behavior under various known attacks.
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15 Cover traﬃc increases network bandwidth consumption,
message delays introduce communication latencies, and per-hop
message encryption necessitates negotiation of shared keys
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In addition, this paper assumes that a good
pseudo ID management is in place. An intermediate
node in MuON can collect pseudo IDs, such as pub-
lic key as a pseudo ID, by participating the gossip-
ing behavior. In order to prevent such a problem, a
mechanism needs to be in place which changes the
pseudo ID randomly at every interval. The general
problem of managing pseudo IDs is left as future
work. Follow up work will incorporate a mecha-
nism into MuON.
Local eavesdropper: A local eavesdropper is an
adversary that can monitor all communications sent
to or received from one particular peer. This adver-
sary tries to detect the identity of communicating
parties by recording and comparing all incoming
and outgoing messages of a particular node. In
MuON, a local eavesdropper on an intermediate
peer, cannot conﬁrm the identities of the communi-
cating parties, even if the message and its header are
received by the peer. This is because the peer cannot
determine the identity of either sender or receiver
with certainty based on the information of the
header. Likewise a local eavesdropper an initiator
(or responder) cannot deduce the identity of the
responder (or initiator).
Collusion Attack: In a collusion attack, peers col-
laborate to identify communicating entities. These
colluding peers could be physically diﬀerent nodes
or a single node with multiple identities. It has been
seen that the degree of anonymity in MuON is
1   1
jSj where S is the anonymity set. This implies
that as long as a pair of peers within the anonymity
set do not collaborate, it is hard for colluding nodes
to diﬀerentiate the initiator, responder and the hon-
est peer(s) from one another. If all jSj nodes within
the anonymity set collaborate, MuON’s degree of
anonymity becomes 0 and the identities of the com-
municating parties can be revealed. However, since
the anonymity set changes for every MSG in the sys-
tem, a large fraction of peers must collaborate to
successfully launch this attack.
Timing attack: In a timing attack, the adversary
(behaving as an initiator) attempts to identify the
responder by analyzing the round trip time (RTT)
of a request, since short RTT indicates that the
responder is nearby. In MuON since the messages
are transferred over the overlay network, RTT mea-
surements do not reﬂect actual network locations.
Thus launching a timing attack is diﬃcult. An
adversary can launch a variant of the timing attack
against MuON, by identifying the initiator as the
ﬁrst node to gossip a particular MSG. To launch this
attack, the adversary would have to trace outgoing
messages of every node within the network, to iden-
tify a particular node as the ﬁrst node to gossip a
message. However, the adversary cannot identify
the responder, since the responder behaves like an
intermediate node and continues to gossip the MSG.
Traceback attacks: There are two kinds of trace-
back attacks: passive traceback and active traceback.
In a passive traceback attack, the adversary exam-
ines the stored routing state of the peers to identify
the path(s) between initiator and responder. To
launch a passive traceback against MuON, the
adversary needs to look at the application level mes-
sage buﬀers at every node within the network. How-
ever, since the messages are periodically removed
from the buﬀers, to perform a successful traceback
the adversary must collect the information before
it is removed. In an active traceback attack, the
adversary has control of the network infrastructure
and is able to follow an active and continuing
stream of packets back through the network to their
point of origin. In MuON, such an adversary can
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identify the sender of a message (it is the starting
point of the message paths). However the recipient
is not revealed (since paths do not terminate at the
recipient).
Predecessor attacks: These attacks occur if the
same path is used by the initiator while communi-
cating to the responder. If a compromised node
records its predecessor, then most of the time the
initiator will be the predecessor. However in MuON
as every node randomly picks up the gossip target,
diﬀerent messages follow diﬀerent paths. Hence this
type of attack is unlikely in MuON.
Traﬃc volume attack: An adversary can diﬀeren-
tiate responders from other nodes by observing the
volume of data transmitted, since initiators generate
less data as compared to responders. This attack is
possible against MuON, if the adversary can
observe the traﬃc generated by each node in the
network.
Intersection Attack: An adversary can record the
members within the anonymity set of a message by
launching a traﬃc volume or traceback attack. To
perform an intersection attack, the adversary ﬁrst
records the anonymity sets of messages for an
extended period of time. The adversary then com-
putes the eﬀective anonymity set, which is the inter-
section of all observed anonymity sets. Since the
initiator and responder are present in each anonym-
ity set,
16 they are always included in the eﬀective
anonymity set. Thus if the network is observed for
a suﬃcient period, the eﬀective anonymity set can
be reduced substantially. We measure the progress
of an intersection attack by measuring the size of
the eﬀective anonymity set at regular time intervals,
relative to the size of the ﬁrst observed anonymity
set. For simplicity, we assume the adversary
observes the entire network.
In dynamic networks, an intersection attack is
assisted
17 due to changes in system membership.
To oﬀset this eﬀect, MuON peers pull data messages
with a probability proportional to their age in the
system. Fig. 21 shows the fraction of peers within
diﬀerent age-groups that pull a given message.
Hence the anonymity sets of successive messages
include the same subset of long-lived nodes, result-
ing in larger eﬀective anonymity sets. Fig. 22 shows
the progress of an intersection attack in MuON
(depicted by solid lines) along with the eﬀective ano-
nymity set solely due to network churn (depicted by
the dashed line). It can be seen that for low values of
Davg, an intersection attack proceeds primarily due
to network churn. According to the simulation
model, since the network in Fig. 22 has churn 0.6,
the session time of peers is exponentially distributed
with an average of 40 cycles (shaded region). Thus
by the time the communicating entities complete
their communication, the eﬀective anonymity set is
still greater than 0.3. Fig. 23 shows the progress of
an intersection attack in networks with varying
churn. Figs. 22 and 24 indicate that defense against
intersection attacks can be improved by decreasing
Davg and increasing pinter.
In summary, we see that MuON can resist most
kinds of attacks in the absence of a global adver-
sary. We believe that such an adversary is impracti-
cal for large and dynamic P2P systems, though
many of these attacks can be thwarted by means
of cover traﬃc [52].
16 This assumes that the initiator and responder are within the
portion of the network observed by the adversary.
17 This motivates some systems [13,14] to restrict system
membership changes, and perform periodic system resets.
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
 0
 10
 20
 30
 40
 50
 60
 70
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
 0.7
 0.8
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
Fraction of nodes
pinter=0.5, skew=3, γ=0, overlay size=4000
Age of nodes (in cycles) 
Churn
Fig. 21. Message distribution.
  0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
  1
  0  10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90  100
E
f
f
e
c
t
i
v
e
 
a
n
o
n
y
m
i
t
y
 
s
e
t
Time (in cycles)
pinter=0.5, skew=3, overlay size=4000
MuON γ=0
MuON γ=1
MuON γ=2
MuON γ=3
System Membership 
Fig. 22. Progress of an intersection attack (churn¼0.6).
930 N. Bansod et al./Computer Networks 52 (2008) 915–934Author's personal copy
4.4. Security guarantees
In MuON, message conﬁdentiality and integrity
is achieved using cryptographic techniques such as
cryptographic hash, public/private keys and session
keys. Hence these guarantees are constrained by the
strengths of the chosen cryptographic algorithms.
When the initiator sends the request, it generates
a nonce r1 and a session key ksession. The initiator
then generates a header containing the nonce, ses-
sion key and the initiator’s public key. The header
is then encrypted using the responder’s public key.
Similarly, the responder includes the nonce in the
header for the response and encrypts this header
with the initiator’s public key. Thus the nonce and
session key always remain conﬁdential. MSG always
encrypts the data and nonce, using the session key.
Since the session keys are not reused, encrypting the
data with session keys helps thwart dictionary
attacks. Thus conﬁdentiality is maintained.
The header, hdr always contains a cryptographic
hash signed by the private key of the sender (initia-
tor in case of requests and responder in case of
responses). The cryptographic hash is computed
over MSG and the required ﬁelds of hdr and is signed
by the sender’s private key. This signed crypto-
graphic hash has several uses. It allows the receiver
to verify the correspondence between a given MSG
and its MSG_HDR. The signed cryptographic hash
helps the receiver detect if an adversary changed
the contents of the message or the nonce. Similarly,
when an initiator receives a response, the initiator
can verify that the response originated from the
responder, because the cryptographic hash is signed
by the responder’s private key. Thus an adversary
cannot masquerade as the responder. Likewise, the
nonce contained within each header and data mes-
sage can be used by the initiator to detect a replay
of a response. If the responder keeps track of nonce
values of the past requests, it can detect the replay
of requests.
It is important to note that MSG_HDR contains an
unsigned value for T deadline, since an intermediate
node cannot verify a signature without knowing
the public key of the originator. Hence a misbehav-
ing intermediate node may increase or decrease the
value of T deadline to either cause the epidemic to die
slowly or quickly; a slow dying epidemic increases
the resources consumed by the protocol, while a
quick dying epidemic would prevent the message
from reaching the destination. However due to the
inherent redundancy within the epidemic, a signiﬁ-
cant percentage of peers need to be misbehaving
to consistently cause delivery failures. In either
scenario, the anonymity and security guarantees of
the protocol remain intact. In general, promoting
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compliance within P2P anonymity systems [53] is an
important research problem, which we plan to
investigate in future work.
5. Conclusion and future work
We have presented MuON, a protocol for pro-
viding mutual anonymity in dynamic P2P networks.
There are two key contributions of MuON; the pro-
tocol provides reliable mutually anonymous com-
munication over dynamic P2P networks, while
maintaining low bandwidth and processing over-
head compared to existing reliable multicasting
approaches, and it exhibits application friendly
characteristics such as bounded communication
latency and message integrity and conﬁdentiality.
A unique feature of MuON is the ability to maintain
anonymity against sustained adversarial attack for a
reasonable amount of time. In order to help resolve
the ineﬃcient bandwidth use problem due to the
broadcasting nature, a methodology to create multi-
ple broadcast groups with high inter-group connec-
tivity for reliable message delivery is currently under
investigation. In the future, we plan to investigate
the use of MuON for creating censorship resistant
services and ‘Denial-of-Service’ DoS tolerant anon-
ymous services.
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